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in Markets with Frictions1
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Abstract
We endogenize the trade mechanism in a search economy with many homogenous sellers and many heteroge-
nous buyers of unobservable type. We study how heterogeneity and the traders continuation valueswhich
are endogenousinßuence the sellers choice of trade mechanism. Sellers trade off the probability of an imme-
diate sale against the surplus expected from it, choosing whether to trade with everyone and how quickly. In
equilibrium sellers may simply target one buyer type via non-negotiable offers (price posting), or may price
discriminate (haggling). We also study when haggling generates trading delays. A price setting externality
arises because of a strategic complementarity in the sellers pricing choices.
Keywords: Search, Prices, Negotiations, Asymmetric Information
JEL: C78, D4, D82, D83
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1 Introduction
A large segment of the macro/labor literature is based on models where market frictions are
made explicit, exchange is bilateral, and prices are endogenously formed. These include workhorse
matching models of the labor market and of monetary economies, where prices are bargained (e.g.
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, Shi, and Trejos-Wright, 1995), and more recent models where
prices are posted (Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000, Burdett, Shi and Wright, 2001, and Moen, 1997).
Since the allocations depend on the trading mechanism assumed to be in place, it is natural to ask
what pricing mechanisms sellers would select, when given the option.
In this paper, we endogenize the trading mechanism in an informationally opaque market with
many sellers and buyers who engage in short-lived trading relationships. We build intuition for the
following questions. How does a sellers pricing selection respond to buyers heterogeneity and his
competitors prices? Is there scope for haggling, or is it optimal to charge the same non-negotiable
price to every customer? Finally, can coordination failures occur in pricing selections?
To answer these questions we use a random matching economy, in which each seller indepen-
dently decides how to price a homogeneous good, given that buyers valuationshigh or loware
unobservable. Paired traders play a two-stage game based on the sellers choice between one of
two prototypical non-cooperative trading mechanisms. The seller may simply make non-negotiable
offers in each stage, à la Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). This strategic bargaining game of imper-
fect information may generate trading delays. Alternatively, the seller can offer to negotiate if the
buyer provides veriÞable information on his valuation. Here the seller commits to let the buyer
make the Þrst offer andin case of disagreementgives him a chance to a second offer. This strategic
bargaining game of perfect information generates immediate trade.
In equilibrium, pricing decisions reßect buyers heterogeneity and also the traders continuation
valueswhich are endogenous. Sellers trade off the probability of an immediate sale against the
surplus expected from it. This implies sellers not only must choose whether to trade with every
possible customer, but also how quickly. This depends on the price and the trading mechanism
retained.
When sales to some buyer type contribute little to the expected surplus, then sellers target only
the other type, via a non-negotiable price that extracts his entire surplus. This market resembles
one in which sellers post prices. Although not everyone may buy, every purchase occurs at a unique
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non-negotiable price, and it is immediate. Such outcomes may arise when buyers valuations are
very different, or when some type is predominant.
When signiÞcant gains are expected from sales to every buyer, then sellers target both types.
This requires sharing surplus with some type, so that the market resembles one in which there is
haggling, since sellers trade at different prices with different customers. Whether trading delays
occur, however, hinges on how sellers choose to price discriminate whichdue to unobservable
valuationsrequires the seller to elicit information. An indirect way to do so is to observe the
buyers response to a high initial offer. This may cause wasteful trading delays, but lets the
seller extract the surplus of low-value buyers. A direct way to elicit information, is to commit to
compensating the buyer for supplying it. In our model, this compensation takes the form of letting
the buyer make the Þrst offer so that surplus is shared with every buyer, but trade is immediate.
Interestingly, equilibria with or without haggling, or with different price discrimination schemes,
may coexist. The reason is traders option values are endogenous, so there are strategic comple-
mentarities in pricing selections. We call this a price setting externality: a sellers pricing choice
is inßuenced by the prices expected to prevail on the market, which determine traders values from
searching for a better deal.2 This may lead to multiplicity of equilibria, and coordination failures.
For example prices may be inefficiently high, so that only some buyers consume, or trading delays
may systematically occur.
2 Related Literature
We contribute to the literature on endogenous selection of pricing mechanisms in several di-
mensions. There are studies on trading mechanism choices of a monopolist selling to heterogeneous
buyers. For example, Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) Þnd the seller should use a Þxed price strategy
if commitment is possible, while Wang (1995) focuses on cost differences in selecting bargaining
or price posting. Instead, we focus on strategic interaction among many sellers, to emphasize how
price setting externalities arise due to complementarities in the selection of trading mechanisms.
Another focus has been the issue of commitment to a price. In a model with both search
and commitment costs, Bester (1994) illustrates how the sellers beneÞt from committing to a
price, rather than bargaining, depends on the commitment choices of all other sellers. Masters and
Muthoo (2000) study the possibility of price renegotiation when heterogeneity is match-speciÞc.
2See also Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), although in our model buyers trading opportunities are stationary.
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Instead, we contrast economies where a commitment technology is or is not available, to show how
commitment can be beneÞcial in eliminating wasteful trading delays.
A third line of research has examined the capacity of different pricing mechanism to better
attract buyers, using directed-search models. Peters (1991) shows bargaining is not a stable insti-
tution as there is always an incentive for sellers to post ex-ante prices. Using a mechanism design
approach, McAfee (1993) proves existence of a unique equilibrium where sellers choose to hold
identical auctionsamong a vast array of mechanismsand buyers randomize over which auction
they participate in. We depart from these studies by assuming search is random, and cannot be
directed. This is because we want to focus on the links between buyers heterogeneity and choice
of trading mechanism, abstracting from the trading mechanismss relative advantages in reducing
matching frictions. Hence in our model, the choice of trading mechanism does not affect buyers
arrival rates, but only their willingness to trade.
Studies have also focused on private information issues. For example, Bester (1993) studies
competition between pricing mechanisms when goods quality is private information. Instead,
we study the case where buyers valuations are private information. Moreno and Wooders (2002)
consider a model with unobservable buyer valuations, and homogeneous sellers, as we do. Unlike us,
they impose bargaining to study trade patterns dynamics and the link between market composition
and types of trades realized. Michelacci and Suárez (2002) study a labor market where Þrms
choose between bargaining or price posting given that workers skills are unobservable. They
assume directed search, to examine whether bargaining allows Þrms to better attract highly skilled
workers.
3 Environment
Time is discrete and inÞnite where t = 0, 1, 2... identiÞes a period. The economy is comprised of
a continuum of agents divided into two sets, sellers and buyers. The mass of agents in each of
these sets is normalized to one. Sellers are endowed with an homogeneous indivisible good from
which they derive no utility. Buyers have no endowment and receive some utility from consumption
of the sellers goods, but have heterogenous preferences. A proportion λ of buyers derives utility
uL > 0 from consumption of the good, while 1 − λ buyers have high valuation uH > uL. Buyers
can transfer utility to sellers. The buyers type i ∈ {L,H} is private information.
At the end of each period sellers choose a trade mechanism characterized by two stages of play,
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within the period. Traders discount next stage payoffs at rate δ ∈ (0, 1). We consider two distinct
cases. In one of them, ex-ante commitment is possible. In the other it is not. Only if ex-ante
commitment is possible can the seller stand by his choice of trading mechanism. At the beginning
of each period t, buyers and sellers are randomly paired. A seller meets a buyer with probability
σ, while a buyer meets a seller with probability α. Unmatched agents sit idle in t and undergo
matching again in t + 1. Paired agents attempt to Þnd mutually agreeable terms of trade via the
trade mechanism selected by the seller. If this cannot be accomplished by the end of t, the match
is dissolved and both agents return to the search pool. If trade and consumption take place the
agents exit the market and are replaced by an identical pair. The distribution of buyers types on
the market is thus constant.3 Agents discount next period utility by 11+r = δ
2.
4 Symmetric Pure Strategy Equilibria
We focus on equilibria where agents play pure strategies that are invariant functions of t. An agent
chooses his strategy taking as given market prices and the strategies adopted by others.
A trading game, taking place in t, is a two-stage game characterized by an offer vector p =
(p1, p2) , p1 in the Þrst and p2 in the second stage. The speciÞcs of the trading game depend on the
sellers selection of trading mechanism, at the end of t− 1. This selection, denoted by π, amounts
to choosing whether to make unilateral non-negotiable offers, π = 0, or to engage in bilateral
negotiations, π = 1. If π = 0 the seller chooses to make an offer in each stage, that the buyer can
accept or reject. If π = 1, bilateral negotiations take place as follows. At the start of the game
the seller offers the buyer the possibility to reveal his type, that is to provide costlessly veriÞable
information. The seller commits to letting the buyer who reveals his valuation make the Þrst-stage
offer. If the seller rejects this offer, a Þnal counter-offer is made in the second stage by the seller,
with probability θ, and by the buyer with probability 1− θ. If the buyer does not reveal his type,
the seller makes a non-negotiable offer in each stage.4 Notice that ex-ante commitment must be
available in order for the seller to be able to credibly propose bilateral negotiations, as he would
renege on his beginning-of-game promises absent commitment.5
3Thus we avoid sorting externalities: the agents strategies do not inßuence the distribution of buyers.
4Assuming traders go on to the second stage following disagreement is w.l.o.g since matching takes place only at
the beginning of t. This implies that disagreement does not change the search pools composition.
5A referee, whom we thank, indicates a practical way to commit. The seller can pay someone to make sales at
say, pf . This agent will pay the seller a large sum, should a sale occur at a different price. Perhaps this is how
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In a match where p is the offer vector, a buyer of type i initiates a purchase at some stage of
the trading game with probability βi = 0, 1. A trade taking place in the Þrst stage at price p1 > 0,
is a simultaneous transfer of goods for utility. It gives p1 period utility to the seller and ui − p1
period utility to buyer i. Utilities from trades occurring in the second stage are discounted by δ.
We let bi(p) and s(p) denote the beginning-of-period expected utilities to, respectively, a buyer of
type i and a seller, from a trade occurring in a match where p is expected. Thus bi(p) = ui − p1 if
trade occurs in the Þrst stage, and bi(p) = δ(ui − p2) if trade occurs in the second stage. Similarly
s(p) = p1 if trade occurs in the Þrst stage, and s(p) = δp2 otherwise.
In general negotiated offers depend upon the buyers valuation. Thus, we let the subscript n
stand for negotiated, so pin = (p
i
n,1, p
i
n,2) represents the price vector negotiated by type i. In
the absence of negotiations the price vector is type independent, so we denote it pf = (pf,1, pf,2),
indexed f for Þxed. The superscript ∗ identiÞes equilibrium market strategies and prices.
4.1 Value functions
The problem of a representative agent has a recursive formulation. Thus, we use a dynamic
programming approach letting Vi denote the end-of-period value of search to a buyer of type i, and
V = max {Vn, Vf} the end-of-period value of search to a seller where Vn and Vf respectively refer
to the value from committing to negotiations and not.
In a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium the distribution of offers p∗ is degenerate. Thus, if
buyers reveal their valuation to sellers committed to negotiations, in equilibrium
rδVi = απ
∗max
©
bi(p
i∗
n )− δVi, 0
ª
+ α(1− π∗)max
n
bi(p
∗
f )− δVi, 0
o
rδVn = σλβ
∗
L(p
L∗
n )max
©
s(pL∗n )− δV, 0
ª
+ σ(1− λ)β∗H(pH∗n )max
©
s(pH∗n )− δV, 0
ª
rδVf = σmax
n
s(p∗f )− δV, 0
o (1)
These are standard ßow return conditions where δVi and δV denote the beginning-of-period con-
tinuation values from avoiding trade. The discount factor δ reminds us that search can take place
only at the beginning of a period6, while V tells us that the sellers choice of trading mechanism
can be revised at the end of each period. Clearly all continuation values depend on the equilibrium
prices p∗; we do not make this explicit, say by writing V (p∗), for notational simplicity.
supermarkets commit to a price: the checkout clerk does not have the authority to set prices and gets Þred if he does.
6For example, if π∗ = 0 the end-of-period lifetime utility of buyer of type i in equilibrium is the sum of two
expected payoffs Vi = αβ∗i (p
∗
f )δbi(p
∗
f )+
h
1− αβ∗i (p∗f )
i
δ2Vi.
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The Þrst line in (1) tells us that a buyer of valuation i meets a seller with probability α. If
the seller negotiates, π∗ = 1, and the buyer reveals his valuation, the offer vector pi∗n arises. In
the absence of negotiations, the buyer expects p∗f . The value of search to a seller committed to
negotiations is described in the second line of (1). He meets buyers with probability σ and if the
buyer is of low valuation, with probability λ, pL∗n results, otherwise pH∗n results. When the seller
chooses to make non-negotiable offers (see the third line in (1)) the vector p∗f is match-independent,
since valuations are private information. Here the sellers payoff s(p∗f ) accounts for the likelihood
that trade occurs in the Þrst, second stage, or not at all, as we later clarify.
Since traders can reject disadvantageous offers at any stage of the trading game (the max
operators in (1)), δVi and δV are bounded below by zero. Furthermore, δVi is bounded above by
α
r+αui, when p1 = 0, while δV is bounded above by
σ
r+σuH , when p1 = uH and λ = 1.
4.2 Optimal Strategies
The discussion above tells us that neither seller nor buyer can do worse than autarky, in equilibrium.
If the match generates unfavorable offers to a trader, he can postpone the transaction in the hope
of Þnding better terms of trade. Unfavorable here means that the prices quoted leave the agent
strictly negative surplus, deÞned as the difference between the net period utility from completing
the trade and the continuation value from avoiding trade. Thus, a transaction accomplished in the
Þrst stage at price p1, gives ui − p1 − δVi surplus to a buyer of type i and p1 − δV to a seller.
Transactions accomplished in the second stage at price p2, give δ(ui − p2 − Vi) surplus to a buyer
of type i and δ(p2 − V ) to a seller, in value discounted to the beginning of the game.
We use this information to discuss the optimal strategies of a buyer of valuation i. This is done
by moving backward in the sequence of choices he faces in a trading game. The buyer will want to
buy at some stage of a trading game where the offer vector is p, given that market prices are p∗,
if the net utility from doing so is no less than his value of search, or
βi(p,p
∗) =
1 if bi(p) ≥δVi0 otherwise. (2)
When the buyers reservation utility constraint is satisÞed, min {ui − p1, δ (ui − p2)} ≥ δVi, he
participates in trade, βi(p,p
∗) = 1. This requires a price smaller than the buyers reservation
price, at some stage of the game. The buyer accepts p1 ≤ ui − δVi, and p2 ≤ ui − Vi.
Moving one step back, at the beginning of the trading game, the buyer might be offered the
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possibility to reveal his valuation in order to negotiate. He will do so if and only if the expected
utility is greater than that generated by passively receiving offers from the seller. The participation
constraint of a buyer of type i is
bi(p
i
n) ≥bi(pf ). (3)
When this inequality holds, it is optimal for a buyer of type i to reveal his valuation to a seller
committed to negotiations.
Finally, it is obvious that a buyer will always enter a trading game with any seller. He can
always refuse to buy at the proposed price, having no loss, while his best alternativedoing nothing
and searching again next periodgenerates zero surplus.
Now consider a sellers selection of trade mechanism, at the end of a period, in the presence of
ex-ante commitment. In doing so the seller considers the market prices p∗ but also the prices p he
expects to arise in a match, based on his choice of mechanism. Feasibility of trade requires that
the sellers surplus is non-negative, at some stage of the game. Thus we say that p is feasible if the
sellers reservation utility constraint is satisÞed,
s(p) ≥ δV. (4)
This implies that for the seller to willingly trade, the price must be greater than the sellers reser-
vation price at some stage of the game, i.e. p1 ≥ δV or p2 ≥ V.
Moving one step back, given p and p∗, the seller chooses between making non-negotiable offers
in each stage, or to let a buyer who reveals his valuation free to make the initial offer (and possibly
a counter-offer). The best course of action must deliver the highest lifetime utility,
π(p,p∗) =
1 if Vn ≥ Vf0 otherwise. (5)
In a symmetric equilibrium, the strategies of an individual must reßect those adopted on the market,
and prices in every match must be identical to those prevailing on the market:
π(p,p∗) = π∗(p,p∗), βi(p,p
∗) = β∗i (p,p
∗), p = p∗. (6)
DeÞnition An equilibrium is an offer sequence p ∈ ©pf ,pinª , strategies {π(p,p∗),βi(p,p∗)} and
lifetime utilities {Vi, Vf , Vn} that are invariant functions of t and satisfy (1)-(6).
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We emphasize that stationarity here means that strategies are invariant functions of t. Due to
discounting, however, price offers are stage-dependent, as clariÞed in the next section.
5 The Determination of the Individually Optimal Offers
Consider an economy where ex-ante commitment is available. To start, we deÞne
pi = ui − δVi and pi0 = ui − Vi. (7)
Here pi is the reservation price of a buyer of valuation i, in the Þrst stage of the trading game, as
it leaves him zero surplus. The price pi
0
refers to the second stage. Note that pi > pi
0 ∀Vi > 0 due
to discounting. Let pi = (pi, pi
0
). In the full information case (λ = 0, 1) the seller would optimally
charge pi. That is p∗ = pH if λ = 1 and p∗ = pL if λ = 0 (see Diamond, 1971). In the remainder
of the paper we focus on the case of heterogeneous buyers, λ ∈ (0, 1).
5.1 Negotiable Offers
Suppose a buyer has revealed his valuation i to a seller committed to negotiate. Then, the
buyer makes a Þrst-stage offer; if refused the seller makes a counter-offer with probability θ (the
buyer makes it otherwise). The following holds.
Lemma 1. Negotiations with buyer i lead to trade at price pin,1 < p
i where
pin,1 = max {δV, δV + θδ (ui − Vi − V )} .
Proof. In appendix.
Negotiated trades are settled immediately due to discounting. The initial offer makes the
seller indifferent to attempting a counter-offer. The sale is settled at the sellers reservation price,
pin,1 = δV, if second-stage trade generates no surplus, ui − Vi ≤ V . Otherwise, the buyer increases
the offer by a fraction θ of second-stage surplus, pin,1 = δV + δθ (ui − Vi − V ) hence pHn,1 > pLn,1.
Here, the lower the buyers likelihood to make counter-offers, the higher the price. The need for
ex-ante commitment is obvious, because the negotiated price is below the buyers reservation price,
pin,1 < p
i. If ui − Vi > V , pin,1 corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution where the threat points
are the values of search, and θ is the sellers bargaining power.
5.2 Non-Negotiable Offers
Suppose buyer and seller play the unilateral offers trading game and the buyers valuation is
private information. Then, the buyer receives a Þrst offer pf,1 whose refusal leads to the sellers
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Þnal offer pf,2, reßecting updated beliefs on the buyers valuation. The offers must be sequentially
rational for pf = (pf,1, pf,2) to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
To determine pf we follow the procedure in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). Following rejection
of pf,1, the offer pf,2 must maximize the sellers second-stage expected payoff, given pf,1 and ex-
pectations revised using Bayes rule. Moving backward, pf,1 must maximize the sellers Þrst-stage
expected payoff, given pf,2. The optimal pf depends on these key elements: the probability of meet-
ing a low-value buyer, λ, the disparity in buyers valuations, uLuH , and the endogenous continuation
values, V and Vi. There are three possible solutions to the sellers pricing problem.
Lemma 2. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) . The optimal non-negotiable offer vector is
pf =

pH if uL − VL < Vbp if uL − VL ≥ V and 1− λ > uLuH
pL if uL − VL ≥ V and 1− λ ≤ uLuH
(8)
where p = (p, pL
0
) and p = (1− δ)uH + δuL − δVL ∈ (pL, pH).
Proof. In Appendix.
There are two key results. First, buyers of low valuation never obtain surplus, so VL = 0.
Second, the optimal offer leaves some buyer type indifferent to making an immediate purchase.
Thus, high valuation buyers might obtain some surplus. The seller sets prices such that buyer
i = H buys in the Þrst stage. If pf,1 is rejected, the sellers learns that the buyer is of low type.
The optimal pricing rule depends on the sellers reservation value in the second stage that, as we
will later see, depends also on the pricing strategies adopted by all other sellers.
To understand these results, one must realize that the seller has two distinct strategies. The
Þrst is reminiscent of price posting. The seller targets a speciÞc buyer offering pi so that type i
buys right away. By offering low prices pL, the sale is immediate but surplus is lost in high-value
trades (hence VH > 0). By offering high prices pH , the seller obtains the entire trade surplus (hence
VH = 0) but faces the possibility of a prolonged customer search.
The second strategy, p, is reminiscent of haggling. Sellers trade with the Þrst customer met,
but the transaction may be delayed. A rejection of the initial high-price offer p, triggers the price
reduction pL
0
sufficient to entice a purchase from low-value buyers. The initial offer p leaves high-
value types indifferent to waiting for the price reduction, so its rejection reveals the buyers true
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(low) value. This screening device is feasible only if delayed low-value trades generate surplus.
The optimal pricing strategy hinges on distribution of types, but also on the continuation
values V and Vi that, we stress, reßect market-prices expectations. These factors inßuence the
sellers opportunity cost of targeting a single buyer type, instead of both, as follows. Offering pH
makes sense when low value consumption generates so little utility that the seller prefers to search
repeatedly for high valuation buyers. Otherwise, a new round of search is never justiÞed and the
sale takes place at the Þrst encounter. Risking a one-stage delay by, making an initial high-price
sales pitch p, is worthwhile in markets that are either dominated by high-value buyers or where
some buyers like the good a lot. Otherwise, the seller will choose to sell the good at once by offering
pL. In any case, low valuation buyers never earn surplus.
6 Existence of Equilibrium
Having analyzed optimal pricing, we study existence of equilibria starting with a benchmark case.
6.1 The Case of No Commitment
When the promise of negotiations is not credible, π = 0 since sellers prefer to make non-
negotiable offers to buyers of known valuation, hence buyers do not reveal it. It follows
Proposition 1. Absent commitment, the following are equilibria:
p∗ = pf =

pH ⇔ uLuH < u¯(λ)bp ⇔ u(λ) ≤ uLuH < 1− λ
pL ⇔ 1− λ ≤ uLuH
(9)
where 0 < u(λ) < min {1− λ, u¯(λ)} and u¯(λ) < 1− λ when λ < λ.
Corollary 1. Equilibria with high and low prices may coexist; pH may coexist with bp or pL.
Proofs. See the Appendix, where u¯(λ), u(λ) and λ are also deÞned.¥
The proposition conÞrms our earlier intuition. Low prices, pL, arise in markets where many
buyers dont care much for the good sold, or where valuations are quite similar. It is otherwise
optimal to raise prices to bp, to discriminate between buyers types, or all the way to pH , targeting
only high-value trades. Looking at the expressions u¯(λ) and u(λ), we see that sellers offer high
prices on a wider range of the parameter space as agents become more patient, or as the proportion
of high-valuation buyers increases. The reason is that sellers option values V increase and so they
will be more inclined to target high-value types.
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The crucial Þnding is the possibility of multiple equilibria, illustrated in Figure 1 and explained
as follows.7 The lifetime utility of high value buyers, hence their reservation price, reßects the
prices expected to prevail on the market (low market prices imply a low reservation price). There
is what we call a price setting externality, as a sellers ability to trade at a given price is affected
by the price selections made by others. Since pricing decisions are uncoordinated, different prices
can prevail on otherwise identical markets. The reason is that traders continuation values depend
on the prices that are expected to prevail.
This opens the door to coordination failures in pricing selections, as is dramatically evident in
markets where valuations are moderately different (see Figure 1). In this case pH and pL coexist
but have very different efficiency levels (see later).8
6.2 The Case of Commitment
The equilibrium set is richer because bilateral negotiations can take place. It is easy to prove
(see the Appendix) that in equilibrium (3) holds. Obviously, low-value buyers prefer to reveal their
type in exchange for the ability to make an initial offer. Thus, should a buyer choose not to
negotiate, the seller would optimally offer pf = pH . Since pHn,1 < p
H , then high value buyers would
prefer to engage in bilateral negotiations. We prove the following
Proposition 2. With commitment, an equilibrium with bilateral negotiations where pin,1 = δV +
δθ (ui − Vi − V ) exists for intermediate values uLuH , and sufficiently large δ and θ. Otherwise, only
equilibria with non-negotiable offers pf exist.
Corollary 2. Equilibria with and without negotiated offers can coexist.
Proofs. See the Appendix.¥
Commitment enriches the equilibrium set, since sellers might have an incentive to share the
surplus with buyers who reveal their valuation. In this case both traders earn surplus, as δV <
7Technically, when u(λ) ≤ uL
uH
< u¯(λ), then pH and bp coexist if λ < λ, while pH and pL coexist if λ ≥ λ and
uL
uH
> 1− λ. When u¯(λ) ≤ uL
uH
then bp is unique if λ < λ and u¯(λ) ≤ uL
uH
< 1− λ, while pL is unique if λ ≥ λ. Note
that bp cannot coexist with pL since offering bp makes sense only under minimal risk of trade delays (small λ), the
opposite of what is required for pL to arise. The numerical illustrations are for δ = 0.95, σ = 0.6, and α = 0.7.
8 If agents remained in the market indeÞnitely, trading repeatedly, they would never change state and their reser-
vation prices would not depend on continuation payoffs. Here pricing and trading decisions would be independent
of the agents continuation value, and would only hinge on his period utility. Hence, strategic complementarities are
absent, and multiple equilibria are impossible when there are no ßows of traders in and out of the market.
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pin,1 < p
i. The buyer gets surplus since he makes the Þrst offer, while the seller gets more than his
reservation price, even in low-value matches, or otherwise he would turn to offering pH .
The need for intermediate uLuH reßects our prior discussion of haggling by setting p
∗ = pf = bp.
The seller has an incentive to discriminate across buyers, by means of negotiations, only if there
is sufficient heterogeneity in buyers valuations. We emphasize that the bounds on uLuH depend on
λ, as in the case of non-negotiable offers (see appendix). The requirement for large δ and θ is
also quite intuitive. Greater patience or a greater facility at making counteroffers give the seller a
stronger bargaining position. Therefore, the buyers initial offer rises in δ and θ. This gives the
seller a greater incentive to negotiate, as he can acquire information about the buyers type, quite
cheaply (Figure 2 illustrates equilibria when θ = 0.8).
Because reservation values are endogenous and reßect expectations of market prices, equilibrium
multiplicity may arise. It is of particular interest to note that each of the two trading mechanisms
may emerge in equilibrium. Indeed, it is as if, haggling takes place, as different buyers pay
different prices. The reason is that if sellers intend to price discriminate, extracting a higher price
from high-value customers, they can overcome private information obstacles in one of two ways.
Sellers can elicit information indirectly, as part of a trading process where the buyer responds to
a sequence of declining offers. Here the seller relinquishes surplus only to high-value buyers, but
trading delays are possible. Alternatively, the seller can elicit information directly from buyers,
compensating them for it, by letting them make the initial offer, and possibly a counter-offer. Here
prices increase in the buyers valuation, delays are avoided, but surplus is shared in every trade.
From an efficiency perspective, eliciting information directly from the buyer appears to be
preferable. This eliminates the incidence of trading delays, so that no surplus is dissipated. How-
ever the equilibrium course of action hinges on market expectations. If prices are expected to be
above pL
0
, for example, sellers have no incentive to reward buyers for information, and no one will
negotiate. Thus, one question remains. How do equilibria compare in terms of social efficiency?
6.3 Efficiency
Let average welfare W (p) measure efficiency. Given the equilibrium price p∗ = p
W (p) = λVL(p) + (1− λ)VH(p) + V (p).
Two key components inßuenceW (p). The Þrst is the relative ease of trade for sellers and buyers. In
a sellers market, σ > α, sellers trade more frequently than buyers hence the efficiency criterion W
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is biased in favor of sellers. The opposite holds in a buyers market, σ < α. Valuation differentials
also matter in ranking outcomes. For instance, selling to those who value minimally the good makes
little sense, in terms of average welfare, when there are many buyers who like the good a lot.
To disentangle these two separate components affectingW, we Þrst study the case where traders
face identical matching probabilities, σ = α (details are in the appendix). Here
W (pH) < W (p) < W (pn) =W (p
L) if uLuH is large
W (p) < W (pH) < W (pn) =W (pL) if
uL
uH
is moderate
W (p) < W (pn) =W (p
L) < W (pH) if uLuH is small
Mechanisms eliciting immediate purchases by everyone, pL or pn, are equivalent as they generate
identical surplus (the way it is shared does not affect average welfare). They are socially preferred
if disparity in valuations is small, as higher prices would only dissipate surplus either form trade
delays (as when p=p) or no trade (as when p = pH). W cannot be a maximum when p = p as this
creates additional market frictions, in the form of trading delays. Thus, it is dominated by either
pn or pL. However, pH maximizes average welfare when low-value trades generate little surplus,
as goods should go only to high-value buyers, in such a market.
When σ and α differ by small amounts, the ranking of outcomes is generally similar (see the
Appendix). A key difference is that, if high and low valuations are not far apart, pL is socially
preferred in a sellers market, but pn is preferred in a buyers market. Intuitively, when buyers
get to do a lot of trading, relative to sellers, every buyer should earn some surplus, which can be
accomplished through negotiations. In a sellers market, the reverse is true.
We conclude that the possibility to exploit commitment in order to carry out bilateral nego-
tiations, is not necessarily optimal. However, it can be beneÞcial in one of two ways. In markets
where sellers want to discriminate among heterogeneous buyers, the possibility to commit to bilat-
eral negotiations has the potential to eliminate wasteful trading delays, (since p = pn may coexists
with pf = p, while pf = pL does not coexist with pf = p). Furthermore, in a buyers market
the possibility to commit to negotiations can help allocate the gains from trade more efficiently,
compared to trading mechanisms based on non-negotiable offers.
7 Conclusion
We have endogenized the trading mechanism in an economy with random short-lived matches
between heterogeneous buyers and homogeneous sellers. We have studied how heterogeneity and the
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traders continuation valueswhich are endogenousinßuence the sellers choice of trade mechanism.
Sellers trade off the probability of an immediate sale against the surplus expected from it,
choosing whether to trade with everyone and how quickly. In equilibrium sellers may simply target
one buyer type via non-negotiable offers (price posting), or may price discriminate (haggling).
When sellers expect small gains from sales to some buyer type, they target only the other type,
via a non-negotiable price that extracts his entire surplus. This market resembles one in which
sellers post prices. Else, the seller will trade with both buyer types, but at different pricesas if
they haggled. This can be done by making a sequence of non-negotiable offers orto avoid trade
delaysby committing to sharing the surplus with buyers who reveal their valuation.
A price setting externality arises because of a strategic complementarity in the sellers pricing
choices. Since individual pricing selections must take into account option values that reßect the
prices expected to prevail on the market, equilibrium multiplicity and coordination failures may
result.
Extensions could include mixed strategies, directed search, or more general trading mechanisms,
to study links between price dispersion and trade mechanism heterogeneity.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a bilateral bargaining match with a buyer of known valuation i. Suppose the offers generate
surplus in the second stage of the match, ui − Vi − V ≥ 0. In this case the seller is expected to
participate in a second stage, should he refuse the initial offer. Then the optimal Þrst stage offer
made by the buyer, pin,1, must solve
pin,1 − δV = δ
h
θ
³
pi
0 − V
´
+ (1− θ)(pin,2 − V )
i
.
Note that pi
0
is the sellers optimal counter-offer in the second stage. It takes away the buyers
surplus. In the second stage the buyer will offer pin,2 = V , i.e. the sellers reservation value. The
solution is pin,1 = δV + δθ (ui − Vi − V ) .
Now suppose surplus cannot be generated in the second stage of the match, ui − Vi − V ≤ 0.
Then clearly pin,1 = δV. Since p
i
n,1 ≥ δV , the seller always trades. The worse case scenario for a
buyer is θ = 1, when he cannot make a counter-offer. Here pin,1 = δui−δVi < ui−δVi. This implies
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that pin,1 < p
i, so buyer i has also some surplus when he negotiates. Thus both buyer and seller
are willing to trade at price pin,1. When negotiations take place
δVi =

α(1−θ)
h
(1−δθ)ui
1−θ −δV
i
r+α(1−θ) if p
i
n,1 > δV
α
r+α (ui − δV ) if pin,1 = δV
(10)
Notice that δ (r + α) > α always (note that rδ = (1 − δ2)/δ). Since V ≥ 0, then uH − VH >
uL − VL > 0. This implies that pHn,1 > pLn,1.
The lifetime utility to a seller, under negotiations is V = Vn where
Vn =
 θσr+θσ [λ (uL − VL) + (1− λ) (uH − VH)] if pin,1 > δV ∀iθσ(1−λ)
r+θσ(1−λ) (uH − VH) if pHn,1 > pLn,1 = δV
(11)
Here uH − VH > V when pHn,1 > pLn,1 = δV and pin,1 > δV ∀i. Notice that (i) uH − VH > θσ(1−λ)r+θσ(1−λ)
and (ii) uH − VH > θσr+θσ [λ (uL − VL) + (1− λ) (uH − VH)] since uH − VH > uL − VL. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2
With no loss in generality let pf,1 = p1 and pf,2 = p2. Let 0 < λ < 1. Conjecture that
uH − δVH ≥ uL − δVL > δV (12)
holds.9 Because we are focusing only on pure strategies, and because future utility is discounted,
we also conjecture that if in equilibrium the seller targets high-valuation buyers, then p1 is chosen
such that βH1 = 1, i.e. a high-valuation buyer trades with certainty in the Þrst stage.
10 We verify
these conjectures below.
Suppose p1 has been rejected. Clearly it is not optimal for the seller to offer a p2 that leaves
surplus to every buyer type, hence p2 ∈
n
pL
0
, pH
0
o
.
9The other cases do not generate asymmetric information, in equilibrium. If max {uL − δVL, uH − δVH} < δV no
trade ever takes place as no match creates surplus. If surplus exists only in one type of match, only one buyer type
buys, doing so in the Þrst stage since the seller knows exactly what type to target, i.e. p = pi. The reason is simple.
In the stage game the price has to be greater than δV (from (4)). If uL − δVL < δV < uH − δVH then p2 = pH0 and
p1 = p
H . In this case, type H accepts p1, while type L never accepts. For a similar reason type L accepts the offer
p1 = p
L, while type H never accepts if uH − δVH < δV < uL − δVL.
10Given that the seller targets high-valuation buyers, it is clearly suboptimal to pick p1 such that the high valuation
buyer refuses the Þrst-stage offer, but accepts the second stage offer.
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Suppose p2 = pL
0
. Clearly, only p2 ≤ pi0 is accepted by i. Now think about p1. Only p1 ≤ pL is
accepted in the Þrst stage by buyer L. Hence, the key is to understand what an H buyer will do
in the Þrst stage. If p1 = pL, then both types accept the Þrst-stage offer. The problem is that the
high-valuation buyer earns surplus, at the sellers expense.
Thus, suppose the seller selects p1 > pL. If he is facing buyer L, he rejects it. Given this the
seller cannot be certain if it is a low- or a high-valuation buyer. The reason is that the H buyer
might also prefer to refuse p1 if p2 is more advantageous. Thus, the seller updates his belief that
the buyer is L, call this updated probability λ
0
, using Bayes rule:
λ
0
= Pr[p1 refused|i=L]·Pr[i=L]Pr[p1 refused|i=L]·Pr[i=L]+Pr[p1 refused|i=H]·Pr[i=H] =
λ
1−(1−λ)βH1
≥ λ
Obviously, λ0 − λ > 0 since a rejection has occurred.11
What should the seller do? Recall that p2 = pL
0
or p2 = pH
0
are the two possible choices.
Thus, suppose she offers pH
0
, to leave the high valuation buyer indifferent. The associated second-
stage undiscounted sellers expected payoff is then λ
0
V +
³
1− λ0
´
pH
0
. Thus, there are two cases
to consider based on whether pL
0
> λ
0
V +
³
1− λ0
´
pH
0
holds or not.
Given our conjecture that in equilibrium p1 is chosen to induce βH = 1, then λ
0
= 1. That is, if
p1 is refused the seller knows for sure that the buyer is a low type. Thus, λ
0
V +
³
1− λ0
´
pH
0
= V,
the sellers her reservation value. It is obvious that offering p2 = pL
0
is better than choosing pH
0
iff pL
0 ≥ V as in this case p2 = pL0 gives the seller a larger payoff. Otherwise, the seller optimally
offers pH
0
. We discuss the two cases below.
1. pL
0 ≥ V ⇒ uL − VL ≥ V
Here the seller prefers to offer p2 = pL
0
. Moving backward, let bp denote the highest p1 that
is accepted by type H, when he expects p2 = pL
0
. Thus, p must satisfy uH − bp − δVH =
δ(uH − pL0 − VH), implying bp = uH − δ(uH − uL + VL). It is evident that bp > pL.
What is then the optimal p1? There can be two cases: p1 = pL, accepted by every buyer, or
11Note that we use Pr [i = L] = λ without loss in generality. This would not be possible if buyers i willingness to
enter the trading game, say the probability ηi(p), hinged on the offers p expected in the match. This could be the case
if buyers could search once more during the period, or if there were an implicit cost to entering the trading match, for
instance. In these cases the sellers prior that the buyer is of low type, call it Λ, must be consistent with the (known)
distribution of types and the buyers equilibrium strategies. Using Bayes rule Pr [i = L] ≡ Λ = ληL(p)
ληLp+(1−λ)ηH(p) .
Therefore Λ = λ in our case, since ηi(p) = 1 ∀i.
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p1 = bp, accepted only by buyer H. In this case the sellers beginning-of-trade payoffs are:
s(p) =
 pL = uL − δVL if p = pL(1− λ) bp+ λδpL0 = δuL + (1− λ) (1− δ)uH − δVL if p = bp (13)
Comparing the payoffs from the two strategies, p = bp if (1− λ)uH > uL, and p = pL
otherwise.
2. pL
0
< V ⇒ uL − VL < V
Here the seller prefers to offer p2 = pH
0
because selling to a low type would generate a surplus
loss. What should be p1? Focus on p1 > pL, since p1 = pL implies there is never a second
stage (all buyers accept it). The seller should not offer pL < p1 < bp, as this leaves buyer H
some surplus (reason: if p1 = bp makes buyer H indifferent when p2 = pL0 , then he will strictly
prefer it when p2 > pL
0
). But then, if it is optimal to target the buyer H in the second stage,
it must be optimal to target him in the Þrst stage, i.e. p1 = pH .12 The buyer accepts it
equilibrium (the seller can lower the price a bit, otherwise). Hence p = pH is optimal and
s(pH) = λδV + (1− λ) pH = λδV + (1− λ) (uH − δVH) (14)
From the discussion above it follows that
bL(p) =

uL − pL = δVL
δ(uL − pL0) = δVL
δVL
if p = pL
if p = bp
if p = pH
bH(p) =

uH − pL = uH − uL + δVL
uH − bp = δ(uH − uL) + δVL
uH − pH = δVH
if p = pL
if p = bp
if p = pH
(15)
are the buyers net period utilities in each possible equilibrium. Notice that (13)-(15) verify the
validity of (12), and that the seller always offers a p1 such that βH = 1, as conjectured.¥
Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
12Reason: we have seen that a rejection of p1 implies an increase in the probability the buyer is L. If it is optimal
to target the high buyer in the second stage, despite it being now less likely that the partner is H, it must be optimal
to target H in the Þrst stage, when it is more likley the buyer is H.
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Here π∗ = 0 hence V = Vf . Consider an equilibrium p∗ = pf , calculate the value functions, and
check (2) and (8) (all other conditions are satisÞed). Using pi, s(p) and bi(p), then VL = 0 and
δVH =

α(uH−uL)
r+α
δα(uH−uL)r+α
0
and δV =

σuL
r+σ if pf = p
L
σ
r+σ [δuL + (1− λ) (1− δ)uH ] if pf = bp
σ(1−λ)uH
r+σ(1−λ) if pf = p
H
(16)
Consider each possible equilibrium pH , bp and pL, separately.
Let pf = pH . From (8), pH is individually optimal if uL − VL < V . This amounts to
uL
uH
< u¯(λ) ≡ σ(1− λ)
rδ + δσ(1− λ) .
Here (i) u¯(λ) is decreasing in λ, 0 < u¯(λ) < σδ(r+σ) and limλ→1
u¯(λ) = 0; (ii) u¯(λ) decreases in r with
lim
r→0 u¯(λ) = 1, since rδ → 0 as r→ 0; (iii) u¯(λ) > 1− λ if λ > λ =
r+σ
σ − 1δ .
Let pf = bp. From (8), bp is individually optimal if uL − VL ≥ V and 1− λ > uLuH . These imply
u(λ) ≡ σ (1− δ) (1− λ)
rδ
≤ uL
uH
< 1− λ
where u(λ) is decreasing in λ, 0 < u¯(λ) < σ(1−δ)rδ and limλ→1
u¯(λ) = 0. Note u(λ) < 1 − λ iff
σ < rδ1−δ =
1+δ
δ , always satisÞed since
1+δ
δ > 1 and σ < 1. Also, u¯(λ) > u(λ), since rδ
2 = 1 − δ2,
and u¯(λ) < 1− λ if λ < λ. Thus pf = pH and pf = bp coexist if u(λ) ≤ uLuH ≤ u¯(λ) and λ < λ.
Let pf = pL. From (8), pL is individually optimal if 1− λ ≤ uLuH and uL − VL ≥ V , rearranged
as σ < rδ1−δ =
1+δ
δ , always holding. Thus, we need
uL
uH
≥ 1− λ. This implies pf = pL and pf = bp
cannot coexist. Since u¯(λ) ≥ 1−λ when λ ≥ λ, then pf = pL and pf = pH coexist when λ ≥ λ.¥
Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 2
We Þrst prove (3) holds, given commitment. From (8), pf,1 ≥ pL and pf,2 ≥ pL0 . Since pLn,1 < pL,
(3) holds strictly for i = L. Suppose (3) does not hold for i = H. Using the deÞnition of bi(p), it
must be that pHn,1 > min{pf,1, δpf,2+uH (1− δ)}. This is impossible: a refusal to negotiate tells the
seller that the buyers type is i = H. Then, the seller would optimally set pf = pH , a contradiction.
If π∗ = 0 the value functions must satisfy VL = 0 and (16).
If π∗ = 1, then (11) implies pHn,1 > pLn,1 = δV only if uL − VL ≤ V . Using (10)-(11) this is
uL
uH
≤ u(λ) = θσ(1− λ)
r + α(1− θ) + θσ(1− λ) .
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By continuity, if uLuH > u(λ) then uL − VL > V so that pin,1 > δV ∀i. Notice 0 < u(λ) < 1 and
u(λ) > 1− λ. if λ > λ¯ = r+α(1−θ)θσ , where λ¯ < 1 if θ > r+ασ+α and r < σ.
Given pin,1 = max {δV, δV + δθ (ui − Vi − V )} and pHn,1 > pLn,1 we must consider three cases: 1)
V ≥ uH − VH > uL − VL in which case pin,1 = δV ∀i; 2) uH − VH > V ≥ uL − VL, in which case
pLn,1 = δV < p
H
n,1, and 3) ui − Vi > V, in which case pin,1 > δV ∀i.
pin,1 = δV ∀i, cannot be an equilibrium: π = 0 since s(pn) = δV implies Vn = 0. pLn,1 = δV <
pHn,1, cannot be an equilibrium either. It requires uL−VL ≤ V , thus the seller would set π = 0 and
pf = p
H (see Lemma 2) since (i) the seller receives no surplus in negotiations with a buyer i = L
as pLn,1 = δV and (ii) the seller earns less by choosing π = 1 since p
H
n,1 = δV + δθ (uH − VH − V ) <
pH = uH − δVH (from Lemma 1, uH − VH > V ).
Only pin,1 = δV + δθ (ui − Vi − V ) can be an equilibrium. Here V = Vn where
δVn =
θσ [δ(r + α)− α]
r [r + α(1− θ) + θσ] [λuL + (1− λ)uH ] .
To prove π = 1 is individually optimal, we must verify that, given p∗ = pn, then s(pn) ≥ s(pf ).
Consider only pf = pL, p since pf = pH is not a possible deviation when p∗ = pn. The reason
is pin,1 > δV requires uL − VL > V , hence pf = pH is suboptimal. Thus compare
s(pn) = δV (1− θ) + δθ [λ(uL − VL) + (1− λ)(uH − VH)]
s(pL) = uL − δVL
s(p) = δuL + (1− λ)(1− δ)uH − δVL
(17)
where VL > 0 since p∗ = pn. SpeciÞcally, from (10), δVi =
α(1−θ)
h
(1−δθ)ui
1−θ −δV
i
r+α(1−θ) .
If θ = 0 then s(pn) < s(pf ), since pin,1 = δV ∀i⇒ Vn = 0. One can provide expressions for uLuH
that satisfy s(pn) = s(pf ). These expressions are cumbersome, so we follow an alternative route.
Since ∂Vn∂θ > 0 and
∂VL
∂θ < 0, then
∂s(pn)
∂θ > 0 and
∂s(pf )
∂θ > 0. Therefore consider the case θ = 1.
Using continuity in θ and δ, we prove existence of p∗ = pn using the intermediate value theorem.
If θ = 1, use Vi and V from (17) to get s(pn)|θ=1 and s(pf )|θ=1 for the mutually exclusive cases
pf = p
L and pf = p.
1) pf = pL is a possible deviation if uL − VL ≥ V and 1 − λ ≤ uLuH (from Lemma 2). Then
s(pn)|θ=1 ≥ s(pL)|θ=1 if uLuH ≤ uL(λ) =
α(1−λ)(1−δ)+r(1−λ)δ
α(1−λ)(1−δ)+r(1−λδ) < 1. Since
uL
uH
> u(λ) is necessary for
p∗ = pn, then π = 1 is individually optimal when u(λ) < uLuH < uL(λ) (from Lemma 2). Since
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prices are linear in θ, ∂s(pn)∂θ > 0 and
∂s(pf )
∂θ > 0, and both functions are continuous in θ, uL and
uH , then by the intermediate value theorem there exists a 0 < θ∗ < 1 and a uLuH = u
∗(λ) ∈ (0, 1)
such that s(pn) ≥ s(pL) for all θ > θ∗ and u(λ) < uLuH ≤ u∗(λ).
2) pf = p is a possible deviation if uL − VL ≥ V and 1− λ > uLuH . It is easy to show that for
θ = 1 then s(pn) ≥ s(p) if uLuH ≤ uLL(λ) =
δr−(1−δ)(r+α)
δr−(1−δ)α . It is obvious that uLL(λ) > 0 only if
δ is sufficiently close to one, and it is negative otherwise. Once again, by the intermediate value
theorem we conclude that there exist θ and δ sufficiently large and an intermediate uLuH such that
s(pn) ≥ s(p) hence π = 1 is individually optimal.
Coexistence. Suppose p∗ = pn. From Proposition 1, u(λ) < u¯(λ) and u(λ) ≤ u(λ) if θ ≤ θ¯ =
δ(r+α)
1+δ(1+α) < 1. Hence, if θ ≤ θ¯ then u(λ) ≤ u(λ) < u¯(λ) so that p∗ = pn may coexist with p∗ = pf
where pf = pH , p. If θ > θ¯ then (i) u(λ) < u(λ) ≤ 1−λ if λ ≤ λ¯ so that p∗ = pn may coexist with
p∗ = pf where pf = pH , p and (ii) u(λ) < 1 − λ < u(λ) if λ > λ¯, so that p∗ = pn may coexist
with p∗ = pf where pf = pH ,pL.¥
Welfare
Given the deÞnition of welfare
δW (pH) = σ(1−λ)r+σ(1−λ)uH
δW (p) = σr+σ [δλuL + (1− λ)uH ]− (1−λ)δ(uH−uL)r(σ−α)(r+α)(r+σ)
δW (pn) = [λuL + (1− λ)uH ] α+θδ(σ−α)r+α(1−θ)+θσ
δW (pL) = [λuL + (1− λ)uH ] αr+α + uL r(σ−α)(r+α)(r+σ)
Let α = σ. Then W (p) < W (pn) = W (pL). Also, W (pH) > W (pL) when
uL
uH
< α(1−λ)r+α(1−λ) , while
W (pH) < W (p) if uLuH >
σ(1−λ)
δ[r+σ(1−λ)] . Notice that
σ(1−λ)
δ[r+σ(1−λ)] >
α(1−λ)
r+α(1−λ) (when α = σ). Therefore
W (p) <W (pH) < W (pL) when α(1−λ)r+α(1−λ) <
uL
uH
< σ(1−λ)δ[r+σ(1−λ)] . Therefore:
(i) W (pH) < W (p) < W (pn) =W (pL) when
uL
uH
is large
(ii) W (p) < W (pH) < W (pn) =W (pL) when
uL
uH
is neither too large nor too small
(iii) W (p) < W (pn) =W (pL) < W (pH) when
uL
uH
is small.
It is easy to show that if uLuH ≥
(1−λ)θ(1+δ−1−α)
(1+δ−1)(δ−1−θλ)+λθα then
∂W (pL)
∂σ
¯¯¯
σ=α
≥ ∂W (pn)∂σ
¯¯¯
σ=α
> 0.
Therefore let σ be in a neighborhood around α. By continuity, in general we can say that:
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(i) If uLuH is large
 W (pH) < W (p) <W (pn) < W (pL) if σ > α
 W (pH) < W (p) <W (pL) < W (pn) if σ < α.
(ii) if uLuH is small
 W (p) < W (pL) < W (pn) < W (pH) if σ > α
 W (p) < W (pn) < W (pL) < W (pH) if σ < α.
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